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ieneUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, Maryland 20742CS-TR-4328UMIACS-TR-2002-106 Feb 2002AbstratThe urrent IEEE 802.11 standard is known tolak any viable seurity mehanism. However,the IEEE has proposed a long term seurity ar-hiteture for 802.11 whih they all the Ro-bust Seurity Network (RSN). RSN utilizes thereent IEEE 802.1X standard as a basis for a-ess ontrol, authentiation, and key manage-ment. In this paper, we present two seurityproblems (session hijaking, and the establish-ment of a man-in-the-middle) we have identiedand tested operationally. The existene of theseaws highlight several basi design aws within802.1X and its ombination with 802.11. As aresult, we onlude that the urrent ombina-tion of the IEEE 802.1X and 802.11 standardsdoes not provide a suÆient level of seurity,nor will it ever without signiant hanges.1 IntrodutionWireless loal area networks (WLANs) arequikly beoming ubiquitous in our every dayThis work was funded by a Critial InfrastrutureGrant from the National Institute of Standards.
life. Users are adopting the tehnology to savethe time, ost, and mess of running wires inproviding high speed network aess. Hot spotareas suh as airports and oee houses are em-braing the tehnology to provide additionalvalue to their ustomers with the hopes of in-reasing their revenue. To ontrol aess andprovide authentiation (a fundamental aspetof the business model for many of these en-terprises), the IEEE 802.1X [7℄ standard hasquikly beome the mehanism of hoie. Whilemonitoring aess, and uniquely identifying theusers of the network is fundamental to manybusiness models in the wireless spae, provid-ing ondentiality is not. As a result, manyorganizations plan to use IEEE 802.1X withoutenryption enabled.One of the main reasons organizations arequikly adopting 802.1X based seurity is thatthe urrent seurity problems with wireless lo-al area networking based on the IEEE 802.11standard are well known [2, 4, 5℄, and the IEEE802.11 standards Task Group on seurity (TGi)have been working on solving the problem forsome time. A ornerstone of the new RobustSeurity Network (RSN) is the reently ap-proved IEEE 802.1X Standard for Port basedNetwork Aess Control. The 802.1X standardis intended to provide strong authentiation,1
aess ontrol, and key management. Unfortu-nately, our initial analysis of the protool whenused in onjuntion with the WLAN 802.11standard shows that the protool fails to pro-vide strong aess ontrol and authentiation.Using the software and tools being developedas part of the Open1x eort1, we were able tomount suessful man-in-the-middle and ses-sion hijaking attaks against a ommeriallyavailable lient/suppliant with little trouble ordevelopment eort.Our attaks sueed beause of several designaws within IEEE 802.1X, EAP, and IEEE802.11. Interesting, the aws are similar in eahprotool{ lak of message authentiity, and lakof state mahine synhronization{ and the re-sulting omposition of these protools reatesthe vulnerabilities desribed in this paper.In this paper, we present two attaks againstthe IEEE 802.1X authentiation and aessontrol mehanisms as used in an IEEE 802.11based ISP network. We rst begin by desrib-ing the basi state mahine of the IEEE 802.11protool. This is followed by desribing the el-ements of the Robust Seurity Network as iturrently stands proposed. Next, we desribeour attaks, and follow the attak desriptionswith a disussion on how the attaks an beprevented by protool hanges. Finally, we on-lude and provide an appendix of several poten-tial denial of servie attaks.2 The IEEE 802.11 Network: Basiseurity MehanismsThe IEEE 802.11 standard speies theMedium Aess Control (MAC) and physial(PHY) harateristis for devies apable of op-eration in the unliensed band (2.4 Ghz and5Ghz). It speies operation in one of twomodes : ad-ho (Independent Basi Servie Set)1The Open1x projet is building open soure imple-mentations of the IEEE 802.1X standard.
or infrastruture (Basi Servie Set) mode. Inad-ho mode, eah lient ommuniates diretlywith other lients (in RF range). On the otherhand, in the infrastruture mode, there is a en-tral entity: the aess point (AP). Eah lientor station (STA) sends pakets to the AP whihtransmits to the destination lient. In this pa-per, we are only onerned with the seurityissues with infrastruture mode. In order to ob-tain network onnetivity, a wireless lient mustestablish a relation with an aess point, alledan assoiation. Complete assoiation with anaess point involves transition among threestates:1. Unauthentiated and unassoiated,2. Authentiated and unassoiated, and3. Authentiated and assoiated.Figure 1 shows the lassi 802.11 state mahine.An 802.11 frame an be of two basi types: amanagement frame or a data frame. A lienttransitions between the states, using speimanagement frames. To transition betweenstate 1 and 2, the STA and AP exhange Au-thentiation Management frames. The primarymethods for authentiation and aess ontrolare open-system, shared-key authentiation andMAC-address based aess-ontrol lists. TheWired Equivalent Privay Protool (WEP) wasdesigned to provide ondentiality for the net-work traÆ. However, reent work [2, 4, 11, 5℄has shown that all of the above mehanism areompletely inseure. In order to evit these se-urity problems, the IEEE standards group hasdesigned a new seurity arhiteture for wirelessloal area networks - the Robust Seurity Net-work (RSN). The ommuniation framework ofRSN revolves around the IEEE 802.1X stan-dard.2
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Figure 1: The Classi 802.11 state mahine.3 IEEE 802.1X standard and TheRobust Seurity NetworkThis setion desribes the Robust Seurity Net-work(RSN) and eluidates the role played bythe IEEE 802.1X standard. In a wireless en-vironment, where network aess annot berestrited by physial perimeters, a seurityframework must provide network aess authen-tiation. RSN provides mehanisms to restritnetwork onnetivity (at the MAC layer) to au-thorized entities only via 802.1X. Network on-netivity is provided through the onept of aport whih depends on the partiular ontext inwhih this mehanism is used. In IEEE 802.11,a network port is an assoiation between a sta-tion and an aess point.The IEEE 802.1X standard provides an ar-hitetural framework on top of whih onean use various authentiation methods suhas ertiate-based authentiation, smartards,one-time passwords, et. It provides port-basednetwork aess ontrol for hybrid networkingtehnologies, suh as Token Ring, FDDI(802.5),IEEE 802.11 and 802.3 loal area networks.RSN leverages the 802.1X mehanism for wire-less 802.11 networks.
RSN provides a seurity framework by ab-strating three entities as speied in the IEEE802.1X standard [7℄: the suppliant, the authen-tiator or network port, and the authentia-tion server. Figure 2 shows the ommuniationsetup. A suppliant is an entity that desiresto use a servie (MAC onnetivity) oeredvia a port on the authentiator(swith, aesspoint). Thus for a single network there wouldbe many ports available (aess points) throughwhih the suppliant an authentiate the ser-vie. The suppliant authentiates via the au-thentiator to a entral authentiation serverwhih direts the authentiator to provide theservie after suessful authentiation. Here itis assumed that all the authentiators ommu-niate with the same bakend server. In pra-tie this might be distributed over many serversfor load-balaning or other onerns, but for allpratial purposes, we an regard them as a sin-gle logial authentiation server without loss ofgenerality.
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Figure 2: The IEEE 802.1X SetupThe IEEE 802.1X standard employs the Ex-tensible Authentiation Protool [3℄ to permita wide variety of authentiation mehanisms.Figure 3 shows the EAP stak. EAP is builtaround the hallenge-response ommuniationparadigm. There are four types of messages:EAP Request, EAP Response, EAP Suess andEAP Failure. Figure 7 shows a typial authen-tiation session using EAP. The EAP Request3
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Figure 4: The EAP Paket.message is sent to the suppliant indiating ahallenge, and the suppliant replies using theEAP Response message. The other two mes-sages notify the suppliant of the outome. Fig-ure 4 shows the EAP paket format. The proto-ol is 'extensible', i.e any authentiation meh-anism an be enapsulated within the EAP re-quest/response messages. EAP gains exibilityby operating at a network layer rather than thelink layer. Thus, EAP an route messages to aentralized server (an EAP server suh as RA-DIUS) rather than have eah network port (a-ess point) make the authentiation deisions.The aess point must permit the EAP traÆbefore the authentiation sueeds. In order toaommodate this, a dual-port model is used.Figure 5 shows the dual-port onept employedin IEEE 802.1X. The authentiator system hastwo ports of aess to the network: the Un-ontrolled port and the Controlled port. TheUnontrolled port lters all network traÆ andallows only EAP pakets to pass. This model
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ketused in 802.1X authentiation.also enables bakward ompatibility with lientsinapable of supporting RSN: an administra-tive deision ould allow their traÆ throughthe Unontrolled port.The EAP messages are themselves enapsu-lated. The EAP Over Lan(EAPOL) protoolarries the EAP pakets between the authenti-ator and the suppliant. It primarily [7℄ pro-vides EAP-enapsulation, and also has sessionstart, session logo notiations. An EAPOLkey message provides a way of ommuniating ahigher-layer (Eg: TLS) negotiated session key.The EAP and the EAPOL protools do not on-tain any measures for integrity or priva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tion.4
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Figure 7: A omplete 802.1X authentiationsession showing the EAP and RADIUS mes-sages.
The authentiation server and the authentia-tor ommuniate using the Remote Authenti-ation Dial-In User Servie (RADIUS) proto-ol [8℄. The EAP message is arried as anattribute in the RADIUS protool. Figure 6shows a typial RADIUS paket for this se-nario. The RADIUS protool ontains meha-nisms for per-paket authentiity and integrityveriation between the AP and the RADIUSserver. Figure 7 shows a omplete 802.1X au-thentiation session.The IEEE 802.1X standard requires that theoperation of the three entities onform to theexeution of spei state mahines. For ex-ample, the suppliant speiation has a oresuppliant state mahine, a port timers and akey reeive state mahine. A ondensed formof the ore suppliant state mahine is shownin gure 8. The exeution of the state mahinedetermines the sequenes of pakets sent, thesuess or failure of the authentiation proess,the retry timeouts et. Thus, the state ma-hines are entral to the seurity of the entiresetup.
4 The Design Flaws in IEEE 802.1XThis setion desribes the design aws we haveidentied when implementing the IEEE 802.1Xstandard. We start by listing the general goalsand onstrut a trust model of the wireless net-work.A wireless network is broadast by nature. Themedia is reahably-broadast i.e. only lientswithin a sender's RF-signal range get the trans-mission. This is a key distintion between wirednetworks. Another important dierene is theentralized nature of traÆ i.e. all traÆ is sentto/from a entral entity - the aess point. In-uened by these fators, listed below are thedesign goals of a seurity framework for IEEE802.11 LANs.Goals of a seurity framework for 802.11:1. Aess ontrol and mutual authentiation:Beause of the inherent broadast nature,it is diÆult to limit the RF signal avail-ability to within a partiular perimeter. Toprotet from parking lot attaks [2℄ strongaess ontrol, ideally on a per paket ba-sis, must be a feature. Mutual authenti-ation should also be performed as aesspoints are untrusted entities from the sup-pliant's point of view.2. Flexibility : Wireless networks have vari-ous environments of usage ranging from anEnterprise network (restrited use, strongondentiality requirements) to a publiwireless ISP (subsribers only, no enryp-tion) at airports and hotels. Tailoringto the onstraints of suh diverse environ-ments, the arhiteture should be able toexibly inlude ondentiality and aessontrol.3. Ubiquitous Seurity : An inherent propertyof a wireless network is mobility. Thus theframework needs to provide authentiationirrespetive of the user being in the home5
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tion 8.5.10.or foreign network. By having a logiallyentralized authentiation server separatefrom the entity providing the servie (a-ess point), a framework an provide suhubiquitous seurity.4. Strong Condentiality : Wireless is inher-ently broadast, thus it is trivial for an ad-versary with a good reeiver to eavesdropon a station's traÆ. Hene the frame-work needs to provide strong ondential-ity guarantees (if the network poliy de-sires). This was the primary weakness instati WEP [4℄. Dynami rekeying needsto be an inherent part of the design.5. Salability : The sheme has to be salablein terms of the number of users and alsoin terms of varying mobility of a partiularuser (moving from one AP to another). Itshould have fast and seure reauthentia-tion mehanisms.Tailoring to the above goals, the design of RSNhas abstrated the role of the three entitiesmentioned earlier: the suppliant, the authen-tiator and the authentiation server. We de-sribe the trust relationships that are inherentlypresent in suh a setup.
The trust model:The primary role of the authentiation serveris to provide strong authentiation and sessionkeys to suppliants. Thus both the authentia-tor and the suppliant trust the integrity of thebakend server whih performs the authentia-tion and issues any keys. Apart from this thereis no inherent-trust between any other entities.Thus the bakend server needs to asertain theidentity of the authentiator and the suppliantto provide them with a session key. Also the au-thentiation proess itself must protet againstintegrity and Man-In-Middle attaks beause ofthe inherent broadast nature of wireless.What RSN provides:1. Per-paket authentiity and integrity be-tween the RADIUS server and AP: Asmentioned earlier, the bakend server andthe AP (authentiator) ommuniate usingthe RADIUS protool [8℄. Eah authenti-ator has a unique shared seret with theRADIUS (bakend) server. All the RA-DIUS messages ontain a Request Authen-tiator eld whih is an HMAC-MD5 of the6
entire paket using the shared seret as thekey. This eld is set by the RADIUS serverand veried by the AP. The reverse is doneby the EAP Authentiator attribute whihis present with the EAP Message attribute[9℄. The EAP Authentiator is a similarhash done by the AP. These two attributesprovide the per paket mutual authenti-ation and also preserve the integrity ofthe ommuniation between the RADIUSserver and the AP.2. Salability and Flexibility: By separatingthe authentiator from the authentiationproess itself, RSN provides good salabil-ity in terms of the number of aess points.It provides the exibility of inluding on-dentiality using the optional EAPOL keymessage.3. Aess ontrol: Using strong higher-layerauthentiation, RSN an provide good a-ess ontrol. Unfortunately, beause ofrae-onditions in the loose onsisteny be-tween the 802.1X and 802.11 state ma-hines, a session-hijak attak an be per-formed (setion 4.2).4. One-way Authentiation: The 802.1Xstate mahines provide for only one-wayauthentiation. The suppliant is authen-tiated to the aess point. The lak ofmutual authentiation an be exploited tomount Man-In-Middle attaks eluidatedin setion 4.1The following setions detail the primary designaws and the exploits.4.1 Absene of Mutual AuthentiationThe primary aw in the design is the asymmet-rial treatment of suppliants and aess points(authentiator) in the state mahines. Aord-ing to the standard, the authentiator (gure5) port is in the Controlled state only when the
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session is authentiated. This is untrue for thesuppliant, whose port is essentially always inthe authentiated state. The one-way authen-tiation of the suppliant to the aess point,an expose the suppliant to potential Man-In-Middle attaks with an adversary ating as anaess point to the suppliant and as a lient tothe network aess point. Figure 9 shows thedetails.The 802.1X authentiator state mahine (refer[7℄ setion 8.5.4 page 51) aepts only EAP re-sponse messages from the suppliant and sendsonly EAP request messages to the suppliant.Similarly, the suppliant state mahine (8) doesnot send any EAP request messages. Observ-ably, the state mahines perform only a one-way authentiation. The trust assumption thatis reeted from this design is that the aesspoints are trusted entities whih is a misjudg-ment. The entire framework is rendered inse-ure if the higher-layer protool also performs aone-way authentiation (like EAP-MD5 [3, 10℄).EAP-TLS [1℄ does provide strong mutual au-thentiation but is NOT mandatory and an beoverridden. Even if it is used, the above designerror an bypass the entire EAP-TLS authenti-ation. As an artifat, a simple Man-In-Middleattak is detailed below whih does this.7
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Figure 10: The Session Hijak by spoong a 802.11 MAC disassoiate message.4.1.1 EAP Suess Message MIM At-takAn EAP Suess message is sent from the au-thentiator to the suppliant, on reeipt of aRADIUS Aess Aept message from the au-thentiation server (RADIUS). This indiatesto the state mahines that the authentiationhas been suessful. Irrespetive of the higher-layer authentiation method used (EAP-TLS,EAP-MD5), this message ontains no integritypreserving information. Also in the suppliantstate mahine [7℄ as shown in gure 8, there isan unonditional transfer to the Authentiatedstate irrespetive of the urrent state. The EAPSuess message sets the eapSuess ag, whihmakes a diret transition to the Authentiatedstate irrespetive of the urrent state.Typiallythis would ause the interfae to ome up andprovide network onnetivity.Thus, an attaker ould forge this paket on be-half of the authentiator and potentially starta simple Man-In-Middle(MIM) attak. The ad-versary an thus get all network traÆ from thesuppliant to pass through it. This ompletelybypassed any higher-layer authentiation andrenders the authentiation mehanism inee-
tive.4.2 Session HijakingFigure 11 shows the RSN state mahine. Theprimary hange is the addition of a fourth stateRSN Assoiated. With IEEE 802.1X, higher-layer authentiation takes plae after RSN as-soiation/reassoiation. Thus there are twostate mahines: the RSN and the 802.1X statemahine. Their ombined ation ditates thestate of authentiation. Beause of a lak oflear ommuniation between these state ma-hines and message authentiity, it is possi-ble to perform a simple session hijaking tak-ing advantage of the loose oupling. Figure 10shows how an adversary ould defeat the aess-ontrol mehanisms and gain network onne-tivity. The attak proeeds as follows:1. Messages 1, 2 and 3: A Legitimate sup-pliant authentiates itself. The EAP au-thentiation phase has more than threemessages, they omitted for brevity.2. Message 4: An adversary sends a 802.11MAC disassoiate management frame us-ing the APs MAC address. This auses8
the suppliant to get disassoiated. Thismessage transitions the RSN state mahineto the Unassoiated state while the 802.1Xstate mahine of the authentiator still re-mains in the authentiated state.3. Message 5: The adversary gains networkaess using the MAC address of the au-thentiated suppliant beause the 802.1Xstate mahine in the authentiator is stillin the authentiated state.
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5 Proposed SolutionsIn this setion we present the hanges that needto be made to the IEEE 802.11 and 802.1Xstandards to prevent the previously disussedattaks.5.1 Per-paket authentiity and in-tegrityLak of per-paket authentiity and integrityin IEEE 802.11 frames (data and management)
has been a key ontributor in many of the pro-tool's seurity problems. The session hijak at-tak presented in setion 4.2 primarily exploitedthe lak of authentiity in management frames.Authentiity and integrity of data frames mustalso be assured to prevent simple paket forgeryattaks. While the integrity of data frames isbeing added when ondentiality is used, thereare urrently no plans by the IEEE to add in-tegrity protetion to management frames.5.2 Authentiity and Integrity ofEAPOL messagesThe lak of authentiity of 802.1X messagesthemselves was one of the primary exploits inthe MiM attaks detailed in setion 4.1. Thisould be aomplished by using an attributesuh as the EAP-Authentiator (refer gure6) present in RADIUS messages. The EAP-Authentiator needs to be added only to thedeision message i.e. EAP-Suess. The key forthis attribute an ome from the higher-layerauthentiation protool suh as the EAP-TLSsession key. Another approah ould be to elim-inate an expliit EAP-Suess message and usethe EAPOL-key as an indiation of suess atthe EAP layer. Figure 12 shows the EAPOLpaket along with the added attribute.
Version = 1 Packet Body LengthPacket Type
PACKET BODY = EAP Message if present
EAP Message Authenticator = HMAC−MD5(packet, session key)
proposed enhancementFigure 12: The hanges to EAPOL: addition ofan EAP authentiator attribute.9
5.3 A peer-to-peer based authentia-tion modelThis setion lists two essential properties thatneed to be built into the RSN framework. Asa result of these, the model beomes more ofa peer-to-peer authentiation using a entraltrusted entity. An advantage of building suh aframework ould be added appliability in thead-ho wireless senario.Symmetri authentiation: Both suppli-ants and aess points should be on-sidered untrusted entities. Hene a moresymmetri (mutual) authentiation modelwould be built into IEEE 802.1X. The sup-pliant state mahine should be similar tothe authentiator, inluding the dual-portmodel. The RADIUS server needs to treatAPs and STAs in a similar manner as faras authentiation is onerned. The onlydierene is that the STA ommuniatesto the RADIUS server via the AP.Salable authentiation: In order to sup-port high mobility, the RADIUS serverneeds to handle the APs in a salable man-ner. The urrent use of per-AP basedshared seret is learly not an easily man-ageable solution. A salable sheme needsto be built to authentiate the APs.6 ConlusionsThe importane of seurity in a wireless en-vironment an not be under stated. Beausethe transport medium is shared{ potentiallybeyond the physial seurity ontrols of theorganization{ permits attakers easy and un-onstrained aess. As a result, strong a-ess ontrol and authentiation beome essen-tial in proteting the organization's informationresoures. Unfortunately, our attaks demon-strate that the urrent RSN arhiteture does
not provide strong aess ontrol and authenti-ation due to a series of aws in the ompositionof protools that make up RSN.Fortunately, however, our attaks an easily beprevented through the addition of message au-thentiity to EAP, and IEEE 802.11 manage-ment messages and through additional steps en-suring the synhronization of the various statemahines.Referenes[1℄ B. Aboba and D. Simon. Ppp eap tls authen-tiation protool. RFC 2716, Otober 1999.[2℄ W. A. Arbaugh, N. Shankar, and J. Wang.Your 802.11 Network has no Clothes. In Pro-eedings of the First IEEE International Con-ferene on Wireless LANs and Home Net-works, Deember 2001.[3℄ L. Blunk and J. Vollbreht. Ppp extensible au-thentiation protool (eap). RFC 2284, Marh1998.[4℄ N. Borisov, I. Goldberg, and D. Wagner. In-terepting Mobile Communiations: The Inse-urity of 802.11. In Proeedings of the Sev-enth Annual International Conferene on Mo-bile Computing and Networkging, pages 180{188, 2001.[5℄ S. Fluhrer, I. Martin, and A. Shamir. Weak-nesses in the key sheduling algorithm of r4.Eighth Annual Workshop on Seleted Areas inCryptography, August 2001.[6℄ IEEE. Lan man standards of the ieee om-puter soiety. wireless lan medium aess on-trol (ma) and physial layer(phy) speia-tion. IEEE Standard 802.11, 1997.[7℄ IEEE. Standards for loal and metropoli-tan area networks: Standard for portbased network aess ontrol. IEEE DraftP802.1X/D11, Marh 2001.[8℄ C. Rigney and et. al. Remote authentiationdial in user servie(radius). RFC 2138, April1997.[9℄ C. Rigney, W. Willats, and P. Calhoun. Radiusextensions. RFC 2869, June 2000.[10℄ W. Simpson. Ppp hallenge handshake authen-tiation protool (hap). RFC 1994, August1996.10
[11℄ A. Stubbleeld, J. loannidis, and A. D. Rubin.Using the uhrer, mantin, and shamir attakto break wep. ATT Labs Tehnial Report, TD-4ZCPZZ, August 2001.Appendix: Denial of Servie AttaksThis setion lists the attaks whih ould po-tentially ause a denial-of-servie aeting theend-host or the network availability itself.EAPOL Logo , EAPOL Start MessagespoongThe EAPOL Logo message is sent from thesuppliant to the authentiator indiating thatit desires to leave the authentiated use of theservie oered[7, 3℄. As shown in gure, allelds of this paket an be easily altered by asimple Man-In-Middle(MIM) setup. A simplespoofed message an thus ause an authenti-ated lient to get logged o. To aomplishthis, the adversary has to send an EAPOL Lo-go to the aess point on behalf of the sup-pliant. This attak ould also be done at theMAC layer by sending a MAC disassoiate mes-sage [6℄.The EAPOL Start message is sent from thesuppliant to the authentiator to start theauthentiation proess with the authentiationserver. Figure 13 shows the EAPOL paket for-mat. Like the EAPOL Logo message this mes-sage an also be easily spoofed.EAP Failure Message spoongThe EAP Failure message is sent from theaess point to the suppliant when the au-thentiation proess between the authentia-tion server (RADIUS) and the suppliant fails.This message an also be spoofed and sent with
Version = 1 Packet Body LengthPacket Type
PACKET BODY = EAP Message if present
EAPOL Start       EAPOL Logoff
EAP Message     EAPOL Key 
EAPOL ASF Alert
Packet Types: PAE Ethernet Type = 0x888e
Figure 13: The EAPOL paket format.the aess point's (AP) MAC address to an au-thentiated suppliant. Aording to the spei-ation for the suppliant state mahine (gure8) [7℄ , on reeipt of the EAP Failure message, ittransitions to the HELD state irrespetive of itsurrent state. One into the HELD state, be-ause of the heldWhile timer, it remains therefor 60 seonds (default value). Thus in order toprevent a suppliant from even trying to reau-thentiate, an adversary just has to spoof theEAP Failure message one every 60 seonds.Spoong of 802.11 management framesSine the IEEE 802.11 management frames on-tain no authentiation element, they an bespoofed ausing a suppliant to get logged ofrom an authentiated session. This disassoi-ate denial-of-servie attak an be performedeven with dynami WEP.Large number of assoiate requestsThe 802.1X authentiation takes plae after theassoiation phase at the 802.11 layer is om-plete with the aess point. An aess pointmaintains onsiderable state information afterassoiation and before 802.1X ompletes. Sineat this point, the station is not authentiated, a11
large number of suh assoiations an be madeby a single station using random MAC ad-dresses. The identier eld in the EAP paketis 8 bits in length. Thus even if an aess pointhas limited the number of parallel assoiationsto 255, a single station an take part in 255 par-allel authentiation requests and prevent anyother station from joining the aess point.
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